Day 1 : Berkshire Hathaway Annual Letter 1977

This post starts off the Berkshire Hathaway Project, a series where I’ll read all the annual shareholder letters that Berkshire Hathaway Chairman Warren Buffett has written.

The first letter that I found on the web site  is from 1977.  Disco was big. The Steelers were awesome.  And the economy was moribund.   As I read the letter, a few elements jumped out, useful for anyone in business–tech or otherwise.

Have an approach.  Buffett talks about in the letter the decision the Berkshire Hathaway has taken towards buying up less than controlling shares of companies it believes in.

We select our marketable equity securities in much the same way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety.   We want the business to be (1) one that we can understand, (2)  with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and  competent people, and (4) available at a very attractive price.   We ordinarily make no attempt to buy equities for anticipated  favorable stock price behavior in the short term.  In fact, if  their business experience continues to satisfy us, we  welcome lower market prices of stocks we own as an opportunity to acquire even more of a good thing at a better price.

Our experience has been that pro-rata portions of truly outstanding businesses sometimes sell in the securities markets at very large discounts from the prices they would command in negotiated transactions involving entire companies. 

Consequently, bargains in business ownership, which simply are not available directly through corporate acquisition, can be obtained indirectly through stock ownership.  When prices are appropriate, we are willing to take very large positions in selected companies, not with any intention of taking control and not foreseeing sell-out or merger, but with the expectation that excellent business results by corporations will translate over  the long term into correspondingly excellent market value and dividend results for owners, minority as well as majority….

This is an unorthodox view, but one we believe to be sound.

Clearly, Berkshire Hathaway had an approach.  And if you read Buffett’s statements over time, the 4 key elements they look for when investing have remained unchanged over the many, many years he’s been investing.

What is interesting in this snippet is the clear willingness to focus on buying non-controlling shares of companies and common stock, if he were convinced that the propsect was a good one.  He basically justifies this view on two fronts.  First, he can buy in more cheaply–makes sense. And, he clearly signals that when he buys in and doesn’t control, he’s making a direct bet on management.

It’s an approach.  Clearly one that’s worked.  The lesson: an approach, have one.

Market dynamics matter. 

I’ve written before about the importance of big market opportunities in being critically important for a startup.  That a great team in a crumby market will get trumped by the crumbiness of the market.  Interestingly, Buffett makes this exact same case in this letter, from 1977.

In his note, he compares and contrasts the performance of two portfolio businesses within Berkshire Hathaway: its textile business and its insurance business.  Both textiles and insurance had great management teams, according to Buffett.  But the market dymaics were totally different, leading to different results.

It is comforting to be in [the insurance] business where some mistakes can be made and yet a quite satisfactory overall performance can be achieved.  In a sense, this is the opposite case from our textile business where even very good management probably can average only modest results.

One of the lessons your management has learned – and, unfortunately, sometimes re-learned – is the importance of being in businesses where tailwinds prevail rather than headwinds.

Again, sage advice that I agree with–aiming for a  big market opportunity makes a tremendous difference.

Recognizing the role of shareholders.

Buffett’s tone in the letter is one that strikes me as doing a great job dileneating the different stakeholders’ roles in the venture.  He discusses the accomplishments and diligence of the different management teams building the different businesses.  He also uses a lot of ‘you’s and ‘your’s’ to reinforce that the shareholders are indeed the owners of the business. See quote above as example.

Deft touch.

 

 

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The Berkshire Hathaway Project

I remember back in 2006, well before the financial crisis of 2008, reading one of Warren Buffett‘s Shareholder‘s Letters that he authors every year to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway.

His foresight in his 2005 letter was prescient, and foretold with chilling clarity the financial crisis of 2008 and the huge impact that derivatives trading had in that market collapse.  In the 2005 letter, he talked about Berkshire Hathway’s long-term attempts to get out of their own derivatives business, which they’d inherited as a part of their acquisition of General Reinsurance.  He talks first about how he’d taken years to try and get out of Gen Re‘s derivative positions, and how they’d wind that down too slowly and in too costly a way.  But he then also makes the following statement as a reflection on this for the broader market:

Our experience should be particularly sobering because we were a better-than-average candidate
to exit gracefully. Gen Re was a relatively minor operator in the derivatives field. It has had the good
fortune to unwind its supposedly liquid positions in a benign market, all the while free of financial or other
pressures that might have forced it to conduct the liquidation in a less-than-efficient manner. Our
accounting in the past was conventional and actually thought to be conservative. Additionally, we know of
no bad behavior by anyone involved.

It could be a different story for others in the future. Imagine, if you will, one or more firms (troubles often spread) with positions that are many multiples of ours attempting to liquidate in chaotic markets and under extreme, and well-publicized, pressures. This is a scenario to which much attention
should be given now rather than after the fact.   The time to have considered – and improved – the reliability of New Orleans’ levees was before Katrina.

(emphasis added.)

He basically called the CDO crash of 2008 exactly, didn’t he?!

As I thought about how insightful and prescient that report was, I wondered if there might be more useful treasure in the whole series of Shareholder Letters.  So starting tonight, I’m going to start reading one Berkshire Hathaway letter per year and write a quick set of observations from the perch of today.

Not sure it’ll be useful, though I expect it’ll be interesting reading indeed.

 

 

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WTF! CFO Loses Job for Facebook & Twitter posts

From today’s WSJ, Gene Morphis, CFO of Francesca Holdings was let go because of his use of Twitter and Facebook to make company related posts.  The posts don’t appear to disclose anything all that juicy, else I’d expect the WSJ and other business journalists would be decrying the insider secrets that the CFO was exposing, pulling the business equivalent of ‘the Weiner.’

Some of Mr. Morphis’ offending posts: “Cramming for earnings call like a final. I thought I had outgrown that…” or “Earnings released. Conference call completed. How do you like me now Mr. Shorty?”

I think that this firing — for cause — is exactly the wrong step for this corporation and indeed for Corporate America writ large.  Facebook and Twitter open up society and connections, indeed they are freeing up information and societies.  Given the corporate scandals and failures that have rocked the US over the last decade–WorldCom, Enron, Madoff, Bear Stearns, Lehman, etc–the business community should be pursuing more openness, not less.  

Indeed, we want and need more transparency from Corporate America, not less.  These tools provide opportunities to do this.  Having  Mr. Morphis getting into a habit of sharing his genuine and open musings across social media drives this transparency, albeit in a small, focused way.  But I do wonder whether these tools and a CFO’s participation in these communities would serve as a deterrent to corporate scandals.  Of course, there’s no evidence here, but I’d wonder.  It drives the CFO to communicate more, generally a good thing.  It also gives more information to investors, even if non-material, also a good thing.  More communication, I would think, should have a slightly positive benefit towards deterring malfeasance or at a minimum exposing incompentence slightly more quickly.  Both good things.

Having a CFO share perspective on non-material, non-insider information through these channels should not be a fireable offense.  It should be applauded.

I’m saddened to see Mr. Morphis go.

 

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Thoughts on the JPMorgan Chase loss

JPMC, bitch!

JPMC, bitch! (Photo credit: Matt Stratton)

I suspect that at some level, JPMC’s CEO, Jamie Dimon, is thinking, ‘Geesh, we can’t even do a bone-headed trade anymore without everyone making a federal case out of it!’  And it turns out, he’d be right, as today surfaced reports of the FBI beginning an inquiry into JPMC and its $2B trading loss.

No one is going to miss an opportunity to pile on to Wall Street broadly and JPMC in particular, and this is especially true for our ruling class in Washington when so much is at stake with the financial regulation/Volcker rule, etc.  We’re re-writing the rules, and JPMC’s loss is a great exhibit as to what can go wrong.

At the same time, JPMC has and should continue to point out the following…  First, it made over $27 billion in revenue in Q1, with over $5B in profit.  So this loss is a little less than one week of revenue.  Second, JPMC has nearly $60B in cash on its balance sheet.   Granted, you’ve got to assume that its not sitting with a toxic set of loans and other assets on its balance sheet–no small feat–but assuming its managing its roughly $2.2T in total assets reasonably well, they’re plenty profitable and cushioned from this fumble.  Not something you want to see happen again, if you’re an investor or employee, but certainly recoverable.

Which brings me back to where we go from here.  Is increased regulation from Washington the answer, or should we just let JPMC continue on its way?

In my view, we need a Volcker rule that works.  In other words, if you’re a bank and you’re getting an explicit or implied guarantee from the government–either by taking government insured deposits or by becoming too big to fail–then you’ve got to divest out of proprietary trading.  I think this makes sense.

In the case of JPMC, they are likely too big to fail and they have retail deposits.  For them, in the event of a larger calamity and downside, its never as simple as just telling them that we’re just going to let you fail–this is too difficult, too many retail accounts get hit, too negative a fall out politically as the debt markets would freeze, etc.

But how to square this with my more libertarian tendencies?  I square it with the poker table.  At poker, a central tenet is that if you bust out and can’t put another chip in front of you, then you’ve got to leave the game.  You don’t get to draw for free.  If you can’t take downside, then you really can’t take any upside.  Very simple.  It makes every player accountable, and it works fine.  Same thing should be true with trading on your account.  If you’re trading, then you need to be able to shoulder whatever losses you undertake.  And if you’re in a situation where we can’t just let you fail, then sorry, you don’t get to play.

 

 

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Facebook disrupting Carrier’s SMS business

Today’s New York Times reports that “Facebook Is Killing Text Messaging.”  Cites that operators are seeing customers moving their SMS traffic off of network (where prices are very high) and are just using Facebook messaging.

It calls out specifically the Philippines, “one of the top texting nations, sent roughly 400 text messages a month each in 2011, down from about 660 a month in 2010,” according to the study.

Makes all the sense in the world: users will take the free versus the pay every time on this trade.

Expect this trend to continue and to accelerate.

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The Vice Tightens

Nokia warned this week of softer than expected revenues and a slower uptake of its new line of gorgeous Lumia phones running Windows Phone.  Nokia also announced aggressive price cuts to drive volume.

Its an expected, necessary response to slow consumer uptake on this launch.   The  price cut also exposes the challenge in front of Nokia and Microsoft–namely that to become a credible “third ecosystem,” they’re going to have to carve out a niche that is distinctly different and protected from Apple/iOS on the high-end, and Google/Android on the low-end.

Though Android is now clearly winning on unit volumes in the smartphone market, Apple is still earning the bulk of profits.  Consumers yearn for Apple products, and Apple appears to still have a lot of marketing magic in terms of whipping us into a frenzy for its new product releases.  And more importantly, the developer ecosystem around Apple  remains strong.  Developers know how to make money on iOS and it remains a ‘must target’ platform from a developer standpoint.  So long as these factors remain true, expect Apple to retain the high end.

Google Android has arrived big time.  Now the leader in terms of unit share run-rate, Android is now the market leader in smartphone shipments.  Being #1 has benefits, in particular, any hardware manufacturer not named Apple basically has to be in the Android ecosystem.  Google’s strategy of giving away the OS and its better than free value proposition to hardware OEMs, which Peter Fenton discusses in this great post, is great competitive defense.  If there’s any weakness in the Android ecosystem, its that the profitability of the developer ecosystem seems lower than iOS’s.  Developers I speak to generally find Android users less likely to pay for an app, less likely to complete in-app purchases etc.  Android runs too many units for developers to not target the platform, but the developer revenue seems less clear.

With these two leaders in place, then the question is how does Nokia / Windows fit?  It will be difficult to compete with Android’s less than free.  To the extent it is successful in gaining (buying?) share at the low end, this strategy has to problems.  First, Nokia/Windows have a business model that will have to likely compete against the better than free model of Android.  While charging nothing to handset manufacturers, Google makes revenue on default searches and reportedly shares this revenue with carriers/handset makers.  This is better than free, and MSFT/Nokia will have a challenge responding.

The second issue here, also important, is the signaling to mobile app developers.  Most mobile app developers I speak to tell me that Android is a broadly distributed platform, but it is nowhere near as profitable (in general) as iOS.  Developers will run you through a litany of complaints: the Android Market is a mess, the in app purchasing platform is weak, users don’t upgrade to the latest versions of the Android OS (or their apps), etc.  The other issue is a function of price point: Android users are generally cheaper and more price sesnitive than iOS users.  Developers know this.  With Windows / Nokia chasing this segment, they are heading into a problem area for their developer efforts–namely, developers will want to understand what the profit profile is for building apps on the platform.

So Windows Phone / Nokia will have challenges fighting against Apple.  And opening a front against Android will I expect prove both costly and difficult to attract developers.  This is the risk of becoming a third ecosystem.  This is what happens when the vice tightens.

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Don’t Go All In, Unless You’re All In

With last week’s monster acquisition of Instagram by Facebook, much discussion ensued.  Is it the dawn of a new bubble?  What happened to RIP Good Times?  Is now the time to start a new company?  Or is Instagram/FBK just too much of an anomaly for us to draw anything from?

FounderInstitute’s Adeo Ressi penned on TechCrunch Instagram Aftermath: It’s Time For Entrepreneurs To Go All-In, which argued that the good times were now in full roll.  Now was the time to start a company, take the leap, etc.

One of the first comments however came from 500startups’ Dave McClure, who basically said, hey don’t go crazy, dawg.

I consider both of these guys terrific for startups at a global scale.  You won’t find two more dedicated to helping founders build and scale their businesses.  So that’s great.

In my own view, I’m more McClurian in my views.  Before I get into the substance of my current views, I do want to provide some historical perspective.  I was in tech during the first bubble, working for Microsoft.  What I saw during the run up of Bubble 1.0 was a lot of people who had no real interest or business in getting started in startups, they just read a bunch of magazine articles and watched CNBC showing the huge pops of an overinflated IPO market and the riches that founders were attaining.  This drew a glut of folks who weren’t really involved in startups for the right reasons, they were interested in getting rich really really fast.  Nothing wrong with that desire per se, but frankly SV appears to be a magnet to this type of thing, and I want to be a caution against it.

So learning from the  97-00 run up, I’d say here what should have been said then: don’t come out here just because it seems like the market is great.  A small group may get lucky, but more likely, you’ll not be one of them, and you’ll be wasting precious time chasing a dream that’s not really yours.  Instead, come out here if you really believe in startups and if you can’t be stopped–by anyting, least of all the state of the market.

OK, history lesson over, now on to my substantive views on the Instagram / Facebook deal as it pertains to whether you should go “All In.”  This is basically just a bit more detail on what I’ve already said, but here goes.

On the one hand, Instagram / Facebook signifies that for truly extraordinary, breakout products, the big guys are going to have to pay up at real prices.  Its also all the more notable given that Instagram didn’t have any revenue.  With the thawing of the IPO markets that we’ve seen in watching Groupon, LinkedIn, and Zynga go out, we’re seeing more paths to liquidity.  All this is good and supports that the market is improving.

At the same time, I’d not go so far as to say that now is the time to go “All In.”  Starting a company is really, really hard for the vast majority of companies.  Finding and building the right founding team: difficult.  Building something that people want : difficult.  Figuring out how to recruit and keep the team on board before you have money to pay them: difficult.  Growing your measly user base: difficult.  Etc.  Etc.  Even in a *GREAT* market, its difficult.

So while FBK-Instagram is exciting and signals an increasing momentum in the marketplace, it doesn’t really change the reality of startups, which is that they are really difficult.

Given that startups are really difficult irrespetive of market, then my view is that you want to think much more about whether you are really well-suited to be involved in startups before you get into starting a company.  If you are wired for the hard work, for the uncertainty, etc., then I’d say anytime is a great time to start a company.  I’d say that you’d probably want to start with Paul Graham‘s blog, which I think is the most useful and concrete place to find useful advice.  And then I’d figure out how you go about getting involved in startups.  Again, irrespective of market.

 

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How to Get a Job in Venture Capital After B-School

Aside from receiving a lot of pitch decks (which I generally love receiving), the second largest category of emails I get are from MBA students (and recent grads) asking how to get a job in venture capital.  This post is for you.

The emails I receive generally take this form:

 Dear Jay,

I’m a second year student at XYZ MBA program, and I’m interested in getting into a career in venture capital (or private equity) after I graduate.   I believe that with my strong analytical background, intellectual curiosity, and leadership skills that venture capital would be a great fit for me.  I would appreciate learning whether BlueRun Ventures has any plans to hire an Associate, and if so, whether I could speak with you about this opportunity.

Sincerely,

Joe (rarely Jane) MBA

 There are a few parts to my answer to this type of approach.

The first question that I would discuss with you is whether working as an Associate help you build a career in venture?   I don’t think that this is at all clear.  The most common post-MBA entry-level jobs are  investment banking or consulting, and both have very established Associate programs.  You join the ‘i-bank’ or consulting firm, and you work at a certain level, and things follow a well defined pyramid of ‘up or out.’  After 12-24 months, you’re either promoted up to the next level of the pyramid, or you move on.  And the skills you learn as an Associate, generally help and prepare you to be a Vice President, which in turn prepares you to become a Managing Director, etc.  Very clear and generally well understood processes exist there.

In venture, this defined process doesn’t broadly exist.  While some firms take an approach similar to what an I-bank or consulting firm would do in an Associate program, most especially in early stage investing don’t take that route.   Instead of setting the Associate up to become a Principal or Partner, the firm asks the Associate to get out into the startup community and meet as many founders as possible, to see everything.  Generally this involves a very large expense account and lots of parties and networking—a job that can be fun as all get out, but not one that necessarily sets you up with the skills you’d need to be value accretive to the firm or the venture industry long-term.  More often, these Associate roles are kind of a two year hiatus of meet a bunch of founders and build your network, help run due diligence, and give input at partner meetings.  Then after two years, you’re meant to get out into the ecosystem to ‘build operating chops.’

This is certainly a route, and to be fair, some who start as Associates do end up climbing the ladder to become Partners.

At the same time, if you’re going to consider doing the Associate gig at a firm, it’d be useful for you to know whether there is a track record at that firm of Associates moving through the ranks or whether it’s more a 2-years and out program.  So that’s the first thing.

The second element to this though is probably even more important, and deserves deeper consideration.  That is a more strategic view of how do you as an individual add sustainable value to a venture firm, thereby giving you differentiated substance as to why you should earn the role relative to your competition.  This is important not only to land a role in venture; its important to think about how you add value over time once you’re in a firm.

To me this is all about what is the equation of value creation in venture, and how you showcase it.  To me there are three elements of value that really matter: (1) proprietary deal flow; (2) credibility; and (3) value add with founders.

Deal flow is lifeblood to a venture capitalist.  And proprietary deal flow is about how do you get access to great deals.  The more of the great deals you can bring to the firm and get done, the more valuable you are.   This is true for anyone in the industry: top partners at the top firms, all the way down to first day on the job associates.

If you don’t have a network in tech startups, you’re at a severe disadvantage IMHO, and you need to work on remedying that.  One MBA candidate who contacts me every few months to look for a job in venture attends a top B-school in the Midwest.  Every time we speak, I tell this person that he’s got to get out here and get to know people and get a network.  Sitting in b-school class in the Midwest does nothing to get him any network or any insight as to what deals are interesting or what teams are worth watching or knowing.  Why wouldn’t a venture firm just hire some kid from Stanford who’s worked on their on campus incubator?

If you’re a b-school student who’s not out here in the Bay Area, then find ways to get out here.  Do a summer internship out here.  Visit during breaks.  Get involved in any way you can so you can meet people and start building a network.

Credibility is also important to build: both with the partners of a certain firm and with founding teams.  This is also a challenge for most MBA candidates targeting early stage firms.  The challenge most often is that the MBA candidate lacks both technical skills and insight and concrete experience working in a very early stage company.  While the MBA candidate may be analytically rigorous and a quick study, their inability to approach a partner or portfolio company founder with credibility of having been in the environment or having had strong technical skills makes it difficult to convey value to stakeholders key to your career.

So my recommendation here is that if you have no operating background in the high tech startup world, then get some.  Work for a small company or even work for a larger established company, e.g., Facebook, Google, etc.  The most important key here is to establish that you have operating chops and you have a perspective formed around getting products into market and getting users interested in what you’re effort has produced.

Finally, and related, you’ve got to have credible value add for founders.  If founders think you’re a joke, you’re not going to survive in the industry.  The good founders all know each other and your reputation in the industry is mostly controlled by these folks.  If you’re useful and effective, then they’ll say that.  If you’re not, they’ll let the network know that too.  Whenever I speak to an MBA candidate about getting a job in venture, I’m visualizing what an interaction with that candidate and one of our portfolio company CEOs would look like.  Too often, my assessment is that the CEO would basically ask me to never put the MBA candidate in the room with them again  as they would be a time waster.

With these as the core components of creating value in venture, then my recommendations to MBA candidates seeking to build a career in venture are basically the following:

Don’t limit yourself to looking for a venture role right out of B-school, look also at operating roles at tech companies.  Especially as so many Associate roles are 2 years in duration and then you’re bumped out into industry to gain operating skills, why not just start by building the operating skills?  In an operating company, you’ll have the opportunity to build a network.  You’ll gain opportunities to create real value and gain experiences that give you credibility in your industry.  This helps you gain credibility with the partners and the founders in your space.  And when you start interacting with rockstar founders, they’ll see you as someone who’s accomplished something, who knows what you’re talking about.

Get out to the Bay Area.  New York and Los Angelese are both surging as startup areas and I don’t mean to take anything away from them.  If you have strong proprietary networks and connections in either place, then sure, consider those markets carefully.  But all things being equal, more venture firms, more startups and more people in the industry are here in the Bay Area.  If you want to build a long-term career in this industry, the smart bet is to come out here.

Evaluate your progress on the 3 elements of value I describe abve, and commit to joining venture in the long term.  I’ve described above what I think are the 3 core elements of adding value in venture.  If you’re really passionate about joining this industry, then commit to getting there in time.  Understand that irrespective of when you join the industry, it will be important to always be making progress on these 3 elements of value add.  In my view, you want to track progress on these 3 elements before and during your career in venture.  So I’d say get started, build your network, build your credibility, and figure out how to add value to founders.

 

Good luck!

 

 

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#STARTUPPROTIP — Inevitability

Last month, I had the good fortune to host a group students from Duke University who had come out to SF & Silicon Valley for their spring break to get exposed to the startup world here.  We ended up at The Counter on California Avenue in Palo Alto, and the folks there at the Counter really took great care of us (topic for another post).

During our time together, one of the students asked me “What exactly are you looking for in the people or the teams you invest in?”  This student then followed it up saying he wanted to understand how what he’d need to do to break-through and gain the attention of an investor despite being just a student.

Now before I go off on my thoughts on this, I’d say that “being just a student” isn’t an obstacle to investment, at least from what I consider the best venture investors.  Benchmark Capital’s Bill Gurley’s recent post, Why Youth Has An Advantage in Innovation & Why You Want To Be A Learn-It-All, illustrates why it’d be a sucker’s bet for venture investors to look past an investment opportunity purely based on the youth of the founder.

Net: if you’re a student and you want to start a company and need to raise money, my view is that you have the same challenges that every other founder faces—you’ve got to build something people want and you’ve got to blast through whichever walls are in your way.

So with the being just a student thing set aside, then to the heart of this guys question, namely, what am I looking for?   If there were 1 single word that I’d site as the thing I’m looking for with the people that I invest in, it’d be this….

Inevitability.

Inevitability means that no obstacle will be too large.  Inevitability means you have a vision of where the world can go that you see, and that you’re the unstoppable force to get the world to buy in to that world.  Inevitability is about focusing on not stopping until you get any number of commitments that are needed—the code written, the product shipped, the customer sold, the investor closed.  Inevitability.

When I think about the many CEOs we are actively working with at BlueRun Ventures, we see different personalities.   Some are very technical, some business driven, some both.  Some are extroverted, others are introverted.  Whatever, there really isn’t a template in my view, different folks thrive at running different types of companies.

But a common thread that I definitely see is a push that drives for inevitability.

So don’t worry about whether you’re still a college student or whether you’re even in college.  (Believe me, having a college degree does not correlate to startup success, just ask Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, or Michael Dell.)   But do worry about how much inevitability you are driving in your business effort.

 

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Advice for Founders: Consider The Efficient Frontier

I’ve gone off on this riff several times in the past several weeks, and so I wanted to turn it into a blog post.  Caveat that I am an MBA, and this will show here.

the Combination of Risk-Free Securities with t...

the Combination of Risk-Free Securities with the efficient frontier and CML (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

According to Wikipedia, the efficient frontier

The efficient frontier is a concept in modern portfolio theory introduced by Harry Markowitz and others. A combination of assets, i.e. a portfolio, is referred to as “efficient” if it has the best possible expected level of return for its level of risk (usually proxied by the standard deviation of the portfolio’s return).[1] Here, every possible combination of risky assets, without including any holdings of the risk-free asset, can be plotted in risk-expected return space, and the collection of all such possible portfolios defines a region in this space. The upward-sloped part of the left boundary of this region, a hyperbola, is then called the “efficient frontier”. For more information see modern portfolio theory.

Put simply, the efficient frontier is saying that any well done investment opne makes matches the risk with the potential reward or return associated with it.  Very low risk investments (e.g., US Treasury Bills) basically assure a return, but a small one.  For risk investments, in junk bonds or startups for example, investors should demand a higher rate of potential return.  The efficient frontier basically illustrates that it is irrational to invest in high risk investments if the expected payout is very low, or conversely that one had better think twice before making an investment that appears very low risk but promises high expected returns (e.g., Bernie Madoff).

Here is why I find this concept useful.  Most of the time, the big issue that drives me not being willing to invest in a company has to do with the fact that the idea and the market opportunity is just not all that big.  Even if the idea became a monster of a hit, the market size and the potential reward wouldn’t be all that interesting.  As a VC, I’m by definition putting capital into very risky investments, and as such I’m not doing my job efficiently, if I’m not looking for huge rewards.  

This thinking is useful for founders, I think.  As a founder, your most precious and valuable resource is actually your time.  Time you spend working on your business idea is time you cannot get back and spend doing something else.  Given that life is short and time is precious, I recommend that people think about the deployment of your time on a risk-reward continuum.  The higher the risk, the higher the potential reward should be.  And so any startup endeavor that you undertake–even if everything goes perfectly from Day 1–is going to be incredibly difficult and fraught with risk.  Very high risk means you need to have the oportunity for very high reward.  

If you are working on a business or startup and you’re not aiming very high in ambition and effort, then I’d probably suggest to you that you’re not deploying your time all that efficiently.  The risk will basically be constant.  Either aim higher in terms of potential reward and ambition, or frankly, de-risk the effort and seek a less dangerous path.

 

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